

# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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LAURENCE LINDNER

CONTINUATION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Monday, 17 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

**Chairman:**

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU

(Ethiopa)

63-03380

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ASSUMPÇÃO de ARAUJO

Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. ISMIRLEV

Burma:

U TUN SHEIN

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. E.A. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.H. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU

ATO M. HAMID

ATO M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACKS  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. H. FLORESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. P. KELLIN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT  
Mr. S. AHMED  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. J.M. EDES  
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D.E. MARK  
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the ninety-third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The Italian delegation has followed with great interest the discussion on items 5b and 5c of our agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) which has provided us with abundant food for thought. The Italian delegation, although it has already stated its views on items 5b and 5c at previous meetings, wishes to speak again on this topic in order to reply to new points raised by the other delegations and to examine in particular the proposal put forward by Mr. Gromyko in the General Assembly of the United Nations on 24 September 1962 (A/PV.1127. (provisional) p.38).

At our last meeting, the delegations of the socialist countries alluded once more to the Soviet proposal for the total elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage. They repeated that they wished to remove the danger of nuclear war completely at the very start of the disarmament process, but that, in order to satisfy the Western delegations, they had finally agreed that some of the nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be retained until the end of the second stage. In putting forward these considerations, the delegations of the socialist countries evidently wished to make two points: firstly that the Western Powers favoured the almost indefinite retention of nuclear weapons, and secondly that the Soviet Union, by its new proposal, had made an important concession to the Western position.

In this connexion, I should like to emphasize at once that the Western Powers have the firm intention of eliminating, as soon as possible, all possibility of war, whether nuclear or conventional. We have at least as great a horror of nuclear war as the socialist countries, but we do not underestimate the danger from conventional conflicts. Thus, we favour any proposal for rapidly reducing the danger of a conflict and later eliminating it completely. But we are opposed to all unrealistic proposals which, by their nature, can constitute only bad propaganda aimed at deceiving the nations. In this connexion, we have abundantly demonstrated how unrealistic and utopian are the proposals contained in chapter I of the Soviet draft treaty dated 19 March 1962. (ENDC/2). The Soviet delegation's decision to put forward new proposals (ENDC/2/Rev.1) is due above all to the recognition of imperative facts which could not be concealed by any dialectical argument. However, we appreciate the effort the Soviet Government appears to have made to take account of these facts, and from the outset the Italian delegation has shown its interest both here and at the United Nations in the proposal made by Mr. Gromyko, and has indicated its desire to study its implications carefully.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In reality, it seems, the Soviet delegation has raised a question of principle. It has said to the Western delegations, in effect, "Tell us first of all whether you accept our proposal or not. The details of its application can be examined afterwards." I would point out in the first place that it is not correct to describe questions concerning devices which can kill millions of people as questions of detail. Apart from this, however, apart from the fact that the size of the stock of missiles to be retained is not a detail, this is a method of negotiation which we cannot accept and which in the present case, as in the question of nuclear tests, would prevent all constructive discussion. Our negotiations are not to be furthered by raising questions of principle or by asking us to say yes or no in advance.

So we still find Mr. Gromyko's proposal rather obscure. That is why my remarks today can only be preliminary, although I hope to have later a more ample and more satisfactory basis for judgement.

I believe that any disarmament proposal must be judged in the light of two well-known fundamental principles: the principle that no party should obtain military advantages during the process of disarmament and the principle that every measure of disarmament should be subject to sufficient control during its application. The first of these principles, which has been described briefly as the principle of equilibrium, deserves some further thought, although it has often been the subject of discussion during our Conference. To my mind, it is clear that the existing equilibrium involves several factors, both military and geographical. These factors combine to form a whole. We can and we must act upon the military factors, for that is the role of our Conference. But we have not the power to change the geographical factors which remain unalterable in spite of progress in means of communication. That is an undoubted fact which we must take into account if we wish to work constructively.

In order to lower the level of armaments without disturbing the equilibrium, and eventually to reduce it to zero, the Western Powers have proposed a system which is very simple, I would say even intuitive, namely a percentage reduction of armaments on both sides. The logical force of this system, which takes into account the evident requirements of balanced reduction, has gradually begun to impose itself, since on the Soviet side, the system of percentage reductions has been accepted for conventional armaments, and we are glad of that. It must, however, be pointed out that an equal percentage reduction in conventional armaments on both sides would give an advantage to

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the Warsaw Pact which, according to trustworthy estimates, possesses a superiority in this field. This reduction can therefore be envisaged only within a comprehensive system of percentages, and conventional armaments are only one of the elements in the present equilibrium.

Another factor is that of the new weapons, the nuclear bomb delivery vehicles. As regards this factor the Soviet delegation, after first asking for the complete elimination of these delivery vehicles from the start, now proposes the retention of some intercontinental missiles until the end of the second stage. Although I do not know the figures, it seems to me that the two alliances - NATO and the Warsaw Pact - possess different quantities of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and it is now even thought that the numbers maybe greater on the Western side. It therefore seems to me quite clear that the balance on the Western side would not be maintained if, after applying to both sides a 30 per cent reduction in conventional armaments, we were to abandon the criterion of percentages and establish a system of reduction by specific quantities. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the proposed quantitative reduction is expressed as an equivalent percentage reduction. We should arrive at the obvious conclusion that, using the system proposed by Mr. Gromyko, one side - probably the West - would have to accept a greater percentage reduction than the other. Suppose, for example, that one side now has 100 intercontinental missiles and the other side has 500, and we allow retention of only 50 missiles on each side, the reduction for the first side would be 50 per cent, whereas for the second it would be 90 per cent. These different percentages would apply to atomic weapons, whereas equal percentages would be applied to conventional armaments. Thus the organic link existing between two constituent elements in the equilibrium having been broken, the equilibrium of the whole would be destroyed. In other words, according to the Soviet proposal, the picture of disarmament after the first stage would appear thus: reduction in conventional armaments; East, 30 per cent, West, 30 per cent; reduction in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles; East x per cent, West x + y per cent.

In addition to the factors in the equilibrium which I have already examined, there is a third factor - military installations or, in other words, bases. Must we go once more into this distinction between national and foreign bases, which we do not accept? We have in Europe bases which we call integrated, because the countries of Western Europe have established a very closely-knit defensive military system which includes common military installations. This collaboration was decided upon by parliaments

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freely elected by the peoples of North America and Western Europe, and on both sides of the Atlantic we intend to respect those decisions until our security has been ensured by general and complete disarmament. On both sides of the Atlantic we are equally and mutually convinced that in the present state of affairs and during the first stage of disarmament this collaboration is absolutely essential to our defence and security.

As regards the situation existing within the Warsaw Pact bloc, I have no details. It is possible that there are no integrated military installations and that military co-operation between the Soviet Union and the other States of the Warsaw Pact has a different character from ours. At all events, the Warsaw Pact undoubtedly has its military bases too, even if these are conceived according to different technical and political principles. I would therefore say to the delegations of the Socialist countries: "If you like, we can call our bases foreign and yours national, but from a military point of view the dangers which these installations represent are the same on both sides. There is just one difference: our European bases are separated by thousands of miles of ocean from our American allies, whereas yours are situated on a continent with immense resources in manpower and materials, which extends to the furthest parts of Asia."

Of course the Western delegations want all these bases to be destroyed on both sides. We want to abolish them forever. That is why the Western delegations are here, in order to find a method of eliminating these bases rapidly and by stages without upsetting the military and geographical equilibrium - those two elements being indivisible. Indeed, the Western proposals (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2) provide that during the first stage these bases shall lose 30 per cent of their military potential on both sides and that by the end of the second stage they shall retain only 35 per cent of their weapons. The socialist delegations demand the total elimination of bases in Europe at the beginning of the disarmament process while retaining all the bases on their side. Is that equilibrium? Unfortunately, I understand that this proposal, which is obviously unacceptable, is linked with Mr. Gromyko's proposal concerning nuclear weapons, which makes this last proposal even more difficult to accept.

In reality, according to the Soviet proposals, the picture of disarmament at the end of the first stage would be as follows: elimination of conventional armaments, East, 30 per cent, West, 30 per cent; elimination of nuclear armaments, East x per cent, West, x + y per cent; elimination of bases, East, none, West x per cent, including 100 per cent of those in Europe.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

To conclude, the Italian delegation considers that Mr. Gromyko's proposal in particular and the Soviet proposals in general do not correspond with the criteria of balanced disarmament. Thus it has only one advantage, namely that in it the Soviet delegation has abandoned the idea that all danger of nuclear war can be eliminated at the first stage of disarmament, an idea which, attractive though it is, was totally unrealistic and might appear even to have been dictated by considerations of propaganda.

The Italian delegation hopes that the Soviet delegation will, in the light of the views which have been stated by the Western delegations during this debate, revise its proposals and bring them more into line with the principle of equilibrium which we have all accepted.

It now remains to see whether Mr. Gromyko's proposal is in conformity with the principle of control. I do not know whether such an enquiry would now be of any interest. We know that any proposal which is to constitute the basis of an agreement must conform with the two fundamental principles of disarmament: equilibrium and control. If it is not in conformity with both of these, it is unacceptable. But, in any case, as regards the question whether Mr. Gromyko's proposal satisfies the requirements of control, I confess that my delegation is not in a position to judge, for the explanations which the Soviet delegation has given in this important matter amount so far simply to the repetition of three lines of article 5, paragraph 3, of the Soviet draft treaty. My delegation therefore wishes to reserve the right to speak again later when, as I hope, the Soviet delegation will have provided us with more ample information on its proposal.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): This morning I wish to raise a problem which is perhaps not closely connected with the item on our agenda which we have been discussing during our recent meetings. However, since our procedure does not bar discussion on any subject within our terms of reference, and since these, may I remind the Committee, include also collateral measures, I hope that in doing so I will be in order. Mr. Dean dealt with some of these collateral measures last Wednesday (ENDC/PV.91, pp.11 et seq.). I propose to touch briefly on some other aspects of the problem today. I have, of course, no desire to have them discussed immediately: all I wish to do this morning is to remind representatives that this item is on our agenda and that it may be useful — and, I would even say, of importance — to enter into the subject very soon.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

It has become ever more clear that, simultaneously with our work on general and complete disarmament, we have to try to reach agreement on some immediate measures which would bring about a détente where it is most urgent, and thus pave the way to arrangements concerning general and complete disarmament. How and where is this trend reflected? First, in the refusal of most of the States not possessing nuclear weapons to become parties to the nuclear armaments race. This may be regarded by them as an act of self-defence against the spread of these nuclear weapons, against being caught in the wheels of what they rightly consider "the vehicle of suicide". Secondly, in the desire to ease tension where it is most likely to lead to a conflict on account of the heavy concentration of arms and armaments and their further growth.

The recent debate on disarmament held in the United Nations General Assembly reflected that tendency very clearly, and I would say even in a way unprecedented by its strength and determination. By now members of the Committee are probably aware of what I am referring to. As I indicated in one of my earlier statements (ENDC/PV.85, p.28), out of sixty-five speakers in the General Assembly, forty-seven supported the idea of denuclearized zones. This figure included representatives of all regions of the world -- from the Far East through Latin America to Africa, and, last but not least, Europe. I believe I shall not be wrong if I say that the idea has thus gained ground and has conquered the minds and imagination of authoritative spokesmen of many governments.

It will be recalled that its beginnings were very modest. At first, the idea of denuclearized zones was limited to one or two areas, but it has been constantly growing. In 1957 and 1958, suggestions were made concerning the establishment of such zones in the Balkans and in the Adriatic. In 1960, it was suggested that such zones should be established in the Far East and in Africa. In 1961, similar ideas were advanced with regard to Latin America. In the same year, the then Foreign Minister of Sweden, Mr. Unden, advanced a proposal to institutionalize those zones as a means against the spread of nuclear weapons. At the same time, if I may again refresh the memory of the Committee, the Antarctic Treaty entered into force, consecrating, as it were, that very idea in regard to a remote but none the less important part of the globe. In December 1961, the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted resolution 1652 (XVI) concerning the recognition of

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Africa as a denuclearized area, and 1962 saw many replies (DC/201/Add.2 and 3, and DC/204/Add.1) coming in to the questionnaire of the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the so-called Uden plan. Out of sixty-two States, thirty-seven approved it, while seventeen favoured the setting up of denuclearized zones. The Brazilian proposal submitted only recently to the General Assembly of the United Nations (A/C.1/L.312) is one more proof that the idea is gaining ground and gaining worldwide support.

One can therefore say without exaggeration that it has by now become a concept recommended for almost universal application: a most important chapter in the catalogue of partial disarmament measures. I suggest that we would be ill-advised to ignore these developments.

The idea itself, has, of course, had many precedents in the past. It will suffice to recall that since the year 1713 -- that is the year of the Treaty of Utrecht -- history has recorded many cases of areas or regions which were given special military status, whether it was article 92 of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna or article 1 of the Convention of 1856 concerning the Aaland Islands. But one of the most interesting, and for our purposes perhaps one of the most instructive, examples which can be quoted is the Anglo-American Treaty of 1817 concerning the limitation in number, tonnage and armaments of men-of-war on the Great Lakes. Its father, as will be known, was none other than James Monroe, then Secretary of State of the United States, and it is an interesting case, for two reasons: first, that the then conflict between England and the United States was first meant to be solved by force; secondly, that finally both sides agreed to recognize the status quo. I think those two reasons which brought about that solution are very instructive, and could be very instructive even today. That is how the Rush-Bagot Treaty came into existence. Though there may from time to time have been difficulties concerning its implementation, yet it survived them and remained in force for almost half a century.

Another proposal on similar lines, which was made but never put into operation, was one submitted by Mr. Guizot in a letter written to The Times of London on 26 January 1871 and addressed to Mr. Gladstone. Mr. Guizot suggested that from certain portions of the respective territories between France and Germany fortresses,

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arsenals and military stores should be prohibited, and he added: "There can be no doubt that if such a stipulation is to be really just and valuable it must be reciprocal." For historical reasons, well known to us all, that proposal has never come into being.

In quoting those examples I do not want to sound anachronistic, as we all know that each of those solutions adopted in the past was the outcome of concrete and specific circumstances. That is why one could not draw a full analogy with the situation of today. However, it may be of interest to note that the easing of tension has been aimed at by way of reducing arms and armaments concentrations in specific areas. Today the problem has different dimensions. It concerns mainly nuclear weapons: hence the idea of denuclearized zones.

Among the proposals which have been presented here and elsewhere is one to which I wish to draw attention again. In submitting it, my government had in mind the particular danger confronting Europe and thus the peace of the world. We were convinced, and we still are, that the elimination of Central Europe, and first of all of the two German States, from the armaments race would constitute an important step towards the stabilization and normalization of conditions in Europe. We also believed that the experience thus gained, both in disarmament and in control, would pave the way to the establishment of similar zones in other parts of the world, thus bringing us nearer to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

It will be recalled that the Polish plan has found widespread support in many countries, not the least in those of Western Europe. It is also known that many objections have been raised against it, of both a military and a political character. It has been argued that its implementation would upset the balance; that it would create a situation more advantageous to the socialist States. That claim was not, in our view, substantiated. Neither is it substantiated by the force or scope of most modern weapons, or finally, by geography, which is so frequently referred to in our debates.

It may be of interest to come back once again to the historical examples. When James Monroe made his proposal in 1815, Castlereagh opposed it, and opposed it for the very reasons I have mentioned: he said that it favoured the United States, on account of that country's geographical situation; that it created a lack of balance between the United States and England which was unfavourable to England. In other words, the argument was used that England was on one side of the Atlantic and the United States on the other. Does not that sound interesting when compared with what is said today? Castlereagh refused the proposal in 1815, but accepted it in 1817.

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Similar views have been advanced on the subject of European denuclearized zones as I indicated earlier, but in reply to those expressions of opinion one could quote the view recently expressed by an authority on the subject:

"We do not believe that the defence of our cities demands that ballistic missiles be located in their midst. Similarly, there is no need to locate weapons in certain areas of Europe if we have the will to come to their defence."

That is what was said. Nor, we submit, was there or is there any validity in the argument that the setting up of such a zone would disintegrate the NATO Alliance, because it becomes ever more clear that it is highly unwise to concentrate nuclear weapons on what can be regarded as the front line, the meeting ground of the two alliances. Changes in strategic thought and concepts which have taken place since we submitted our plan -- in particular, in recent months --, far from disproving, have only confirmed the reasoning which lay behind it.

The same could be said of the political elements involved. It has been argued that the adoption of the plan would make the solution of the German problem more difficult. But could anyone seriously claim that the present situation has brought us nearer to the solution of the German problem by one inch? Or will the continuation of the present situation bring us any nearer to the solution? The concentration of arms and armaments in Western Germany, intended by some to be a remedy for the political difficulties, has made the issues much more complicated.

As I indicated the other day, the armaments race has become in itself an additional, highly complex political problem; so much so that we shall have to find some remedy for this very issue prior to or simultaneously with our tackling the substantive political problems we had been facing before. It was Mr. Strauss who claimed some time ago that one could not disengage militarily if one did not do it politically; but do we not want to do both? Mr. Strauss did not.

I hope the Chairman will forgive me -- and I know it is highly unpleasant if one criticizes somebody else's allies -- but, regretful as it is, we cannot but be seriously concerned with the policy so far conducted by the Federal Republic of Germany. If members of this Conference had had to go through that most terrible experience which we had to -- faced with the biological extermination of our whole nation, with which Hitlerite Germany was determined to crown its rule over Europe --

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they could not feel otherwise. It is most fortunate that they had no need to go through this experience. But if we speak of the need for security, who is more entitled to claim it than a nation which has lost one-fifth of its population? We do not claim, nor do we request, any special privileged treatment, nor do we ask that it be treated in a special way; all we suggest is that our experience be taken into account. Is it too much? I suggest that it is and should be of value to all of us for the lessons of history are valid to all. Can the basic right to a peaceful and secure life be denied to us, irrespective of the political and economic system we belong to? By claiming it, we do not trespass and we have no intention of trespassing on the rights of others; but no one should trespass on our rights. That is what I had in mind when speaking the other day on the mutual relationship of security (ENDC/PV.92, pp.18 et seq.) -- that is, a spirit of co-existence as we understand it.

What I have said may suffice. When we submitted our plan, we did not claim that it was a panacea, the best or only solution for Europe's ills. We submitted it in all humility as a basis for discussion. We made it clear from the very outset that we were ready to take into account reasonable suggestions in order to modify it, and so we did. We did take into account many suggestions made by the West. Thus, the second and third versions of our plan were born.

We feel, and we are ever more convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases tension and contributes to instability, because the more atomic triggers there are the greater is the likelihood of one of them being pulled, the greater the danger of a catalytic war. Recent trends among the great majority of nations -- not only of Europe, but of the whole world -- have only confirmed our view. How right the representative of Nigeria was, in speaking on denuclearized zones in the First Committee of the General Assembly during its current session, when he said:

"Their justification is that they limit the area of infection and to that extent make the basic problem more containable." (A/C.1/PV.1271, p.8)

It is only regrettable that, as opposed to the great majority of the nations of the world which refuse to take, have or produce atomic weapons there are still some which claim them for themselves -- and, strangely enough, in Europe. They know that atomic war is suicidal, particularly in Europe, and yet they claim atomic weapons most likely to lead to war for themselves -- allegedly, to help themselves.

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We feel that the creation of denuclearized zones, apart from stopping the spread of those dangerous weapons, would have a highly beneficial effect by excluding an ever-growing number of States from the armaments race. They will thus rid themselves of the ever-growing burden of armaments and be able to devote their resources to the raising of standards of living, to the fighting of hunger and disease. So would we. We should like to do it and to devote much more than we do today to the welfare of our people. I am sure that many other nations would like to do the same.

According to the report on the economic and social consequences of disarmament by the Secretary-General, (E/3593), the world is spending roughly 120,000 million dollars annually on military expenditure. That is equal to two-thirds of the entire national income of all of the so-called economically under-developed countries. I wonder how much out of these resources could be spent for really productive purposes?

We suggest that the time is ripe for this Committee to embark on a discussion on the subject of denuclearized zones and, to those who may hold otherwise, I would quote the words of a well-known English writer, which I read recently:

"The time will never be 'ripe' for disengagement -- just as colonial peoples are never 'ready' for political freedom."

We trust that time and events have altered what has hitherto been a negative approach of some of the great Powers to the concept of denuclearized zones. We think that we have discovered an indication of this in several speeches and declarations made of late, in particular during the last session of the United Nations General Assembly; and, whatever the reasons for opposing this idea were, time and events may have contributed to their being changed. They were definitely ripe for review.

Students of history know very well that many ideas which had very modest beginnings, and which at first inspired little sentiment and were met with suspicion and mistrust, with time and experience have grown into generally accepted concepts, finally to be generally recognized and implemented. That is how many constructive solutions were brought into practice in international relations.

We feel that one of those ideas, which has by now found such widespread support, is the very idea of denuclearized zones. It has the backing of public opinion in many countries. Some people may call it propaganda, but public opinion is a force. May I remind representatives that no less an authority than the

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Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, in a very well known judgement, called opinion one of the most important sanctions of international law. That is why we have to take public opinion into account. We have to follow it, for there is much wisdom in it. The idea of denuclearized zones has today gained wide support among peoples and governments, and it has thus been placed on the political agenda of our day.

Within this framework you find the proposal submitted to the Committee of the Whole in a memorandum of the Polish Government of 28 March 1962 (ENDC/C.1/1). In submitting it, we acted in the spirit of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and in the desire to contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. It aims at the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Europe, linked with the elimination of rockets and the limitation of armed forces and conventional armaments. That memorandum was placed on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and it awaits the Committee's consideration.

We firmly believe, as Mr. Wladyslaw Gomulka stated in a speech a few days ago, that this plan:

"... is based on a mutual compromise, with no detriment to either side ... and that it increases the possibilities of peaceful solutions in this neuralgic area".

That is why we commend to the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee the consideration of the idea of denuclearized zones in general, and our proposal in particular.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The delegation of Canada has listened with particular attention and interest to the statement which has just been made by the representative of Poland, Mr. Lachs. Without commenting on the principal substance of what he had to say, we were perhaps a little gratified to hear the Rush-Bagot Treaty quoted as one of the few successful arms limitation treaties which can be found throughout the history of this subject. As one of the partners, we were naturally gratified by the reference which the representative of Poland made to this treaty; and I think that Canadians who have spoken on this subject have a record of quoting this Treaty with a certain amount of what perhaps might be called self-satisfaction. Others who

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

regard it in a more detached way might say that we have made a virtue of necessity. But we would say, in passing, that we think that the comparison which was made between conditions in North America in 1817 and those existing in Europe today, and the relations of Powers on other continents thereto, left quite a few factors out of account.

Passing now to the main subject of my statement, today we wish to make some comments on the Soviet Union's new proposal on the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (ENDC/55), and in general on item 5 b of the agreed agenda. (ENDC/1/Add.3) In doing so we shall doubtless again go over some of the arguments and repeat some of the views which have been expressed previously by other Western delegations, and especially what was said by the representative of Italy earlier today. Nevertheless it seems that some of these arguments will bear repetition, and therefore I shall repeat them.

On 7 September 1962, in plenary meeting, the Canadian delegation criticized (ENDC/PV.82, pp. 9 et seq.) the original proposal of the Soviet Union to eliminate all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage (ENDC/2). Our criticisms were, first, that the proposal was not in accordance with the principle of balance, and secondly that the Soviet Union had not been able to show how this proposal could be verified -- how it could be shown with certainty that all nuclear weapon vehicles had been destroyed and that none remained. Those criticisms in no way meant that Canada is not anxious to see the danger of a nuclear war eliminated as soon as possible. They were intended to show that the then Soviet proposals were not likely to bring about this desirable effect.

It has already been mentioned since we resumed our meetings here that the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada welcomed the announcement by the Soviet Foreign Minister, at the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September, of the Soviet Union's decision to modify its proposals on this subject so as to allow the retention of agreed limited numbers of certain types of missiles until the end of the second stage of general and complete disarmament. Mr. Green said that the new Soviet proposals could help to remove the block to negotiations in Geneva which had been created by the previous incompatible positions of the two sides on that question. He went on to point out that agreement on this key problem of disarmament would inevitably require careful examination of all the related factors. We have now been meeting for three weeks since the Conference resumed, and I regret to say that, although I have studied the records carefully, I have been unable to find any information, not even one single fact, about the new Soviet

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proposals which was not contained in the text of the articles themselves as tabled in the General Assembly last September. Although we have heard sincere requests from many quarters for clarification or elucidation of those proposals, they have so far gone unanswered.

In the circumstances, it is difficult to have a fruitful discussion on the Soviet proposals. If real negotiation is to come about, as all of us hope, the Soviet proposals must be examined in the light of the two basic disarmament principles --- and that is a point made by the representative of Italy ---, the principle that all measures of general and complete disarmament must be balanced so that at no stage could any State gain military advantage over another, and the principle that all disarmament measures should be implemented under such strict and effective control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. The application of those two principles to the earlier Soviet proposals was examined at length in this Conference and, as a result, certain changes were made in the Soviet Union's plan. The new approach contained in the revised proposals must be examined in the same way, but how can this be done if we are not told what those proposals involve, what is their meaning or content?

The representative of the Soviet Union said:

"We are prepared to discuss the question of the precise number of missiles with the Western Powers after we have found a common platform with them, after we have received a favourable reply from the other side to our proposal."

(ENDC/PV.90, p.25)

We hope that that is not to be a repetition of the Soviet Union stand in this Conference in regard to other subjects, a stand which can be summed up as saying: "You must agree to accept our idea in principle, before we will discuss any details of it with you," because that, of course, is an impossible demand; it is impossible to conduct our business in that way. Our Soviet Union colleagues frequently say that what they want is a "businesslike discussion". Well, to Western minds, at least, it is not realistic or businesslike to accept a proposition before you know what you are accepting. The old proverb about not buying a pig in a poke has been quoted here several times. We might use another metaphor. Suppose one of us were about to buy a house. What would we think if the owner said: "Before you can have any information about this house, you must agree in principle that you are going to buy it. Once you have agreed to that, then I will answer your questions about whether the foundations are sound, whether the roof leaks, whether the plumbing and the heating are working properly, and so on. But any answers will only be forthcoming

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after you have agreed in principle to buy the house". I think my colleagues will hardly dispute that that would be a most unbusinesslike demand for the owner to make, if he wanted to sell his house.

Similarly it is not reasonable, not businesslike, for the Soviet delegation here to demand that, as a prior condition to detailed discussion and information about any of its propositions, the Western Powers should accept them in principle. Well, then, what could be a reasonable basis for discussion? I suggest that we can discuss any proposition about disarmament on a hypothetical basis, that is: suppose that proposition to be adopted, what consequences would flow from it? What are the steps necessary to put it into effect? How is it to be verified? Would at all stages the principle of balance be observed? What are its quantitative aspects — the numbers of the various kinds of armaments affected? And so forth.

The United States outline of basic provisions for a disarmament treaty (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2) is open to negotiation in that way, as we have been repeatedly assured. I do not think that the United States delegation here pretends that all details of its proposals have been worked out in full. The position is that the details ought to be worked out in the Conference here between the parties concerned.

Suppose the Conference should start to examine the Soviet proposition, which for short I will call the Gromyko proposal, in that way. It seems to the Canadian delegation that some of the questions which have to be discussed and which require to be settled are the following.

How is the existing number of ICBMs — intercontinental ballistic missiles — to be reduced to whatever is decided upon as the strictly limited number which will be retained until the end of the second stage? To avoid using numbers, we can suppose that the United States has "a" ICBMs and the Soviet Union "b" ICBMs which are to be reduced over a certain period of time to "x" and "y" ICBMs respectively. I would point out that the number held by each side does not necessarily have to be exactly the same. The numbers, however, should be near enough together that neither side can make what is called a pre-emptive attack on the other — that is, by a surprise attack to destroy the opponent's capacity for retaliation, his effective deterrence. The number chosen should not be a particularly small one if we are to have one of the advantages of that system of reduction, which is to enable the parties to disregard or discount the possibility of the concealment or inadvertent retention of a small number of nuclear weapon vehicles. Suppose it were estimated that there was a possibility of, say, 10 ICBMs over the agreed restricted number being somehow retained by one Power or the other, then the total agreed number to

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be retained should be set at about 100 -- the ratio of 10 to 100 -- for then 10 more or fewer in the possession of either side would not seriously affect the balance. Those figures are, of course, merely illustrative, to show the principle of the selection of the final number, which seems to the Canadian delegation to be rather important.

Now, if the number "b" of ICBMs is to be reduced to the number "y" of ICBMs, that must take place by stages. The stages, their steps and their phasing, would have to be worked out. We suppose that the Soviet Union would propose the same method of control as it has in the past, that is to have the declared surplus of "b" minus "y" demolished in the view of inspectors. There is still the question of convincing all parties that no more than the agreed number is retained. That would require the gradual opening of territories to inspectors during the reduction of ICBMs from "b" to "y". We should like to be informed about what the Soviet Union has in mind regarding that means of verification.

All other types of nuclear weapon vehicles are to be destroyed under the Soviet Union plan as amended by the Gromyko proposal. It will be necessary to examine the phasing of their destruction relative to that of the ICBMs, with a view to ensuring that at no stage would the principle of balance be infringed. The reductions of ICBMs, of the other nuclear weapon vehicles of lesser range and power, and of conventional forces and armaments will all have to be phased with each other in order to ensure that the principle of balance shall be kept at all stages.

The Canadian delegation will probably have something more to say at later meetings about the question of verification as applied to this particular aspect of disarmament. In this respect, there are interesting possibilities opened up under the new proposals -- if these new proposals are explained and developed -- which did not exist in the original Soviet proposal for the total elimination of all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage. I shall also probably have to make further remarks about the question of balance. As we all must realize, the problem of reducing foreign bases, as they are described by the socialist delegations here, is related very closely to the problem of reducing nuclear weapon vehicles. These bases, it is clear, are a factor in the nuclear destructive power which can be launched against the territory of the Soviet Union, and should be considered in that relation; the total relation of the power to deliver nuclear weapons of the two sides.

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There is another question to be considered, which is: when, and under what conditions, will the restricted numbers of "x" and "y" ICBMs finally be abolished? Here, as the representative of the United Kingdom and others have said, the question of peace-keeping comes in. This is because the Gromyko proposal, if it can be worked out in detail, could solve the problem of an outlaw nuclear force, and, as I have already mentioned, it could solve the problem of the concealment, intentional or inadvertent, of relatively small numbers of nuclear weapon vehicles. Methods of inspection could probably be devised which would make it impossible to conceal any very large number.

But, in working out the implications of the Gromyko proposal and the other proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles which are before the Conference, their ultimate and extremely important significance must be kept in mind. This is that there must be a recognition by the United States and its allies which are nuclear Powers on the one side, and by the Soviet Union on the other side, that neither side has any interests which would be benefited by the destruction by nuclear weapons of the other side, or of any considerable part of its people and wealth. As a corollary it will require a joint resolve that they will abandon the race for superiority in nuclear weapons. This would really mean taking the path to co-existence in a peaceful world, and not continuing to drive along the broad highway to co-extermination, as we seem to be doing at the present time. And finally, it would require the great nations to determine to co-operate within a properly organized United Nations in keeping peace in the world. All this would be a great change, a very great change, from what we have at present. It is only through such mutual understandings and assurances, tacit or explicit, that it will be possible to abolish the threat of nuclear war -- this threat of nuclear war about which so many people have spoken here and in the United Nations General Assembly recently. There is no magic formula, no principle propounded by either side, which, if adopted, will banish the danger which weighs so heavily on the world.

How can a start be made in bringing about this essential change? It seems to me that the great nuclear Powers could start, here in this Committee, by a frank and full examination of all the elements involved in the Gromyko proposal, together with other proposals which exist in the United States and Soviet Union draft disarmament

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treaties, and with which the new proposal must be integrated. And there should be an end to the delays and deadlocks produced by such ultimatums as: "It is first necessary that you accept this proposal in principle before we tell you what it really means."

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I wish to speak very briefly with regard to the intervention of the representative of Poland. As I understood it, the representative of Poland was not suggesting an immediate discussion in our plenary meetings of the topic which he raised, but I believe it would be useful very briefly to remind the Committee of the attitude of the United States towards the proposals of the Polish Government which contemplate the establishment of nuclear-free zones in central Europe.

The Committee will recall that the Polish delegation presented its proposals on this score to the Conference on 28 March last (ENDC/C.1/1). Perhaps I might best refresh the memory of the Committee on the position of the United States by quoting only two paragraphs from a statement which was made on 3 April last and published by the Department of State:

"While it is recognized that the proposals of the Polish Government, usually identified as the Rapacki plan, have been advanced from a desire to contribute to the maintenance of peace, careful study of these suggestions has led the United States to the conclusion that they would not help to resolve present difficulties.

"The principal objections of the United States to the Rapacki plan, which purports to be a confidence-building measure, have been and remain:

- "(1) That the measures envisaged do not address themselves to the nuclear weapons located in the Soviet Union, the use of which against Western Europe has been repeatedly threatened by Soviet spokesmen;
- "(2) That the plan would therefore result in a serious military imbalance;
- "(3) That, consequently, while creating an illusion of progress, it would, in reality, endanger the peace of the world rather than contribute to maintaining it.

"The dangers to peace resulting from such an imbalance, under present conditions, have been clearly and repeatedly demonstrated by events within memory of all."

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I very much appreciated Mr. Lachs' eloquent speech, to which I listened with the greatest attention, for I have the sincerest admiration for his great talents as historian, orator and debater. I should like, however, to make one remark on the subject of our agenda. It is true that we have established a procedure which allows delegations the greatest freedom to speak on any subject they wish which is relevant to general and complete disarmament.

however, in the matter of collateral measures, there have been quite long negotiations between the two co-Chairmen during previous sessions as to which measures should be placed on our Conference's agenda. The two co-Chairmen agreed first of all to place on the agenda the question of war propaganda, on which, unfortunately, we were unable to come to an agreement. Later they agreed on two other questions; accidental wars and the spread of nuclear armaments. We began discussion of these collateral measures during our last session.

It does not follow that the two co-Chairmen have agreed to place on the agenda the question of denuclearised zones. That is why, although I listened with interest to Mr. Lachs' statement, I do not want us to become involved in a discussion of a collateral measure upon which our co-Chairmen have not agreed.

My delegation has always favoured the thorough discussion of collateral measures, and in the past has often supported the convening of our Plenary Committee. We are always in favour of discussing those collateral measures contained in the list proposed by our co-Chairmen (ENDC/C.1/2). This list, as you know, was accepted on the principle that measures proposed by the Eastern and Western delegations should be examined alternately. I should not like this balance to be upset by the introduction, without the consent of the two co-Chairmen, of a particular measure which has not been proposed by the Western delegations.

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): The list of speakers for today has now been exhausted. Do the co-Chairmen have any recommendations concerning the order of business for our next meeting? Can we take it that we should continue with the same agenda on that occasion?

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I have had no discussion with my Soviet co-Chairman with regard to a recommendation for the agenda of the next meeting. Therefore I speak only for my delegation. We believe that, since we shall have only two more plenary meetings before the agreed recess and since the delegations that speak may well wish to discuss various topics that are before the Conference, no recommendation from the co-Chairmen on the precise agenda for the next two meetings is required.

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I take it that the members of the Committee agree with this procedure.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its ninety-third plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Ato Haddis Almayehu, representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, Poland, Canada and the United States of America.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 19 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12 noon.